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The Anglo-German Industrial 
Productivity Puzzle, 1895–1935: A 
Restatement and a Possible Resolution

ALBRECHT RITSCHL
International productivity comparisons are often plagued by discrepancies be-
tween benchmark estimates and time series extrapolations. Broadberry and Bur-
hop present both types of evidence for the Anglo-German comparison. For their 
preferred data, they find only a minimal German productivity lead prior to 
World War I, while use of a revised industrial output series for Germany by 
Ritschl leads to implausible results. This article presents further time series revi-
sions and substantial corrections to the Broadberry and Burhop benchmark esti-
mate. Results strongly suggest a considerable German productivity lead over 
Britain prior to World War I, which eroded during and after the war. 
esearch on international productivity comparisons has highlighted 
the difficulties in reconciling benchmark comparisons across coun-
tries with backward extrapolations from other benchmarks. Whether 
such productivity puzzles are genuine or just the result of incomplete 
data exploration has been controversial.1 Recently, Stephen Broadberry 
and Carsten Burhop [henceforth B & B] looked into benchmark com-
parisons of Anglo-German industrial productivity to evaluate two rival-
ing indices of German industrial production against each other.2 They 
found that a recent revision to the German index of industrial produc-
tion by Ritschl would induce an Anglo-German productivity puzzle for 
the pre–World War I years, while the traditional industrial output data 
for Germany by Walther Hoffmann does not.3
 This observation led B & B to discard the revised industrial produc-
tion index for Germany in favor of the traditional one. Specifically, they 
argued that the revised German output series yields an implausibly high 
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German productivity lead over Britain on the eve of World War I, 
which is not borne out by their comparative productivity estimate for 
1907. Once the older, disputed industrial output index was employed in-
stead, the fit with the 1907 productivity benchmark was good. 
 A trade-off therefore seems to exist between the quality of the fit 
and the quality of the series employed. Hoffmann’s index of industrial 
production has been criticized for the implausibly high levels of indus-
trial recovery in the late 1920s, and again in the 1930s.4 Among other 
things, it implies that output in metal-making and metal processing 
was 70 percent above the prewar level in 1929, and no less than 180 
percent higher than the prewar levels in 1938. Building on a large 
German literature on failed economic reconstruction after World War 
I, Ritschl argued that Hoffmann’s index was heavily upward biased, 
and was grossly inconsistent with existing evidence on iron and steel 
consumption, as well as with output data from the relevant subsectors.5
If it takes this index to reconcile productivity benchmark comparisons 
between Germany and Britain, there is an Anglo-German productivity 
puzzle that has to be resolved. 
 This article revisits the Anglo-German industrial productivity puzzle. 
To resolve it, it revises the time series evidence one more time and also 
recalculates the 1907 productivity benchmark. Three clear tendencies 
emerge from this exercise. First, the revisions to the German industrial 
production index by Ritschl can be further substantiated for the 1920s.6
Second, new evidence by Rainer Fremdling and Reiner Staeglin on ar-
mament industries hidden in Germany’s 1936 industry census suggest a 
slight upward revision of levels in that year.7 Third, careful revision of 
the 1907 benchmark leads to significantly higher estimates of German 
productivity. This is largely, but not entirely due to removing upward 
bias in B & B’s estimates of German employment. If similar lower cut-
off levels in firm size are assumed as in Britain (and as in the 1935 
benchmark), the German productivity lead becomes much more pro-
nounced. And there is no contradiction between the corrected time se-
ries evidence and the corrected benchmark for 1907—in short, no An-
glo-German productivity puzzle. 
 The findings of this article relate to a long debate about the produc-
tivity of German industry relative to Britain’s before and between the 
World Wars. An older literature, by scholars such as Alexander Ger-
schenkron or David Landes, took it for granted that German industry 
4 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
5 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
6 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
7 Fremdling and Staeglin, “Die Industrieerhebung.” 
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had enjoyed a substantial productivity lead over Britain prior to World 
War I.8 Evidence also suggested that the comparative productivity per-
formance of German industry was not similarly strong in the 1930s.9 All 
this pointed to a relative decline of German industry in the interwar pe-
riod, which seemed consistent with contemporary indices of industrial 
production worked out by Rolf Wagenführ.10 Pessimistic assessments of 
the state of German industry given by contemporary economic experts 
after World War II further bolstered this view. Adam Tooze has gone as 
far as to argue for an industrial failure of Germany in the 1930s.11
 Revisions to the conventional wisdom about Anglo-German com-
parative productivity trends were prompted by Fremdling’s work for 
1907 and by Broadberry and Fremdling’s or 1935/36.12 These studies 
found productivity in German manufacturing to be roughly at par with 
Britain’s before World War I, and slightly ahead of Britain’s before 
World War II. Broadberry related Germany’s poor industrial showing 
before World War I to its large peasant agriculture and its backwardness 
in services.13
 Recently, new studies have emerged, which recalculated the old re-
sults with refined methodologies and from a broader database. Broad-
berry and Burhop recalculated Fremdling’s productivity benchmark 
comparison for 1907 and arrived at broadly the same results.14 And 
Herman de Jong, Fremdling, and Marcel Timmer reworked the 1935 
productivity benchmark.15 Yet in spite of an improved methodology and 
access to vastly better data, they again arrive at broadly the same aggre-
gate results, important sectoral differences notwithstanding. They also 
found that proper adjustments of employment levels are crucial: the 
British industry census methodology used in Germany in 1935/36 en-
tailed a significantly narrower employment concept than the German 
workplace censuses of 1907, 1933, and 1939, because it excluded em-
ployment in small establishments, as well as seasonal and part-time in-
dustrial employment in largely agricultural areas. My revisions to the 
industrial productivity benchmark of 1907 follow the same logic: I sug-
8 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness; Landes, Unbound Prometheus.
9 Rostas, “Industrial Production” and Comparative Productivity; and Paige and Bombach, 
Comparison.
10 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft” and Die deutsche Industrie.
11 Tooze, Wages.
12 Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison”; and Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Pro-
ductivity.” 
13 Broadberry, Productivity Race.
14 Broadberry and Burhop, “Comparative Productivity.” Fremdling, “Productivity Compari-
son.”
15 de Jong, Fremdling, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing.” 
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gest adjustments that make the coverage of German industrial employ-
ment comparable to the British census in 1907 as well. 
RESTATING THE PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLE 
 The first step toward resolving the Anglo-German productivity puz-
zle is to restate it. B & B employed two different indices of German in-
dustrial output in the 1935 and 1907 benchmark comparisons with Brit-
ain. The first was the traditional Hoffmann series, which Broadberry has 
also used.16 With this index, B & B find no inconsistency between the 
backward extrapolation from 1935 and the productivity benchmark 
comparison for 1907. The alternative index relies on Ritschl’s correc-
tions to Hoffmann’s series.17 When B & B extrapolate backward from 
1935 with this index, the discrepancies with the 1907 benchmark are 
substantial. 
 In addition to replicating their exercise, this section also includes the 
industrial production series of Wagenführ, which was used semi-
officially in the interwar period.18 The upper panel of Table 1 shows 
three different time series estimates of German labor productivity rela-
tive to the United Kingdom, calculated from the three indices of Ger-
man manufacturing output. All data shown in the upper panel of Table 1 
are backward extrapolations from the comparative industrial productiv-
ity level of 102 (United Kingdom = 100), found by Broadberry and 
Fremdling for 1935, and for comparable sectors of industry.19 Employ-
ment as well as U.K. output is the same as in B & B. 
 The backward projections in the upper panel of Table 1 all suggest a 
German productivity lead over Britain on the eve of World War I. Us-
ing Hoffmann’s industrial production series, Broadberry obtained a 
mere 6.5 percent German lead for 1907.20 My attempted replication of 
this estimate in Table 1 points to a 15 percent German productivity lead 
that year. When B & B use Ritschl’s correction of Hoffmann’s index, 
they obtain a 1907 productivity lead of almost 50 percent, a puzzling re-
sult that they discard as implausible.21 My replication of their estimate 
using the same data and methods finds a lower—yet still substantial—
30 percent productivity lead for 1907.22 If I use the Wagenführ index 
16 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; and Broadberry, Productivity Race.
17 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
18 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft.”
19 Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity.” 
20 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum. Broadberry, Productivity Race.
21 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” For 1895, this estimate would suggest that German industrial 
productivity was over 70 percent ahead of Britain, which is even harder to believe. 
22 For 1895, German productivity would now be a more moderate 15 percent ahead of Britain. 
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF COMPARATIVE PRODUCTIVITY IN GERMAN MANUFACTURING 
(United Kingdom = 100) 
 1895  1907  1929  1935 
Panel A: Backward Projections 
Using Hoffmann         
 Broadberry  108.6  106.5  104.8  102 
 My replication  101.8  115.4  107.1  102 
Using Ritschl         
 Broadberry and Burhop  172.3  149.7  115.5  102 
 My replication  115.3  130.7  115.4  102 
Using Wagenführ   99.9  131.7  111.1  102 
Panel B: Productivity Benchmarks 
Broadberry and Fremdling        102 
Fremdling 95
de Jong, Fremdling, and Timmer        105 
Broadberry and Burhop    105     
Notes: All data refer to changing territory. Data exclude mining, utilities, and construction. Data 
for Britain are from Feinstein, National Income.
Sources: Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; Broadberry, Productivity Race; Ritschl, “Spurious 
Growth”; Broadberry and Burhop, “Comparative Productivity”; Wagenfuehr, “Die Indus-
triewirtschaft”; Broadberry and Fremdling, “Comparative Productivity”; Fremdling, “Productiv-
ity Comparison”; and de Jong, Fremdling, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing.” 
instead, the German productivity lead in 1907 is again around 30 per-
cent.23 Overall, use of the Wagenführ series and Ritschl’s revision of 
Hoffmann’s index lead to similar results. 
 The lower panel of Table 1 provides an overview of the existing 
benchmark productivity comparisons. With a mere 95 percent of British 
productivity in 1907, the Fremdling benchmark is probably on the low 
side.24 The B & B benchmark for the same year suggests a modest 
German productivity lead of 5 percent and fits Broadberry’s time series 
projection for 1907 almost perfectly.25 The fit would still look accept-
able for my reconstruction of Broadberry’s time series extrapolation 
with Hoffmann’s index.26 For the revised series of Ritschl, as well as 
the Wagenführ estimate, the discrepancy between their 30 percent pro-
ductivity lead and the 5 percent suggested by the benchmark is consid-
erable—although it is still far below the 50 percent productivity lead 
23 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft.”
24 Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison.” 
25 Broadberry, Productivity Race.
26 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum. Broadberry, “Manufacturing,” suggests a 10 per cent error 
margin between a given benchmark and time series projections from a different benchmark. 
Evaluated against the B & B benchmark, the Hoffmann index would meet this criterion, while 
the others would not. 
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suggested by B & B for the Ritschl series.27 Yet even the remaining dis-
crepancies are puzzling: it seems that improving the time series worsens 
the fit with the 1907 productivity benchmark. This discrepancy is the 
Anglo-German productivity puzzle. 
REVISITING THE TIME SERIES EVIDENCE 
 To resolve the productivity puzzle in Table 1, one strategy is to pick 
the series that produces the best fit, and to discard the rest. This is the 
option chosen by B & B, and it leaves the researcher with Hoffmann’s 
index for Germany.28 The price to be paid for this is committing to a 
time series that is likely to exhibit spurious growth across World War I. 
Ritschl examined Hoffmann’s index in the light of disaggregate indus-
trial output data for 1913 and the late 1920s.29 His finding was that 
Hoffmann’s series for capital-goods industries did not match with exist-
ing contemporary data on machine building and related industries. To 
construct alternative estimates of output in the metal processing indus-
tries, he used series from the respective industry associations, as well as 
a detailed commodity-flow estimate of equipment investment in the 
German economy by Gerhard Gehrig.30 The resulting series were con-
sistent with the official statistics on gross investment as well as with 
domestic steel consumption and machinery exports.31 They also fit the 
components in Wagenführ’s index of industrial production.32 But they 
differed sharply from Hoffmann’s estimate for the same industries.33
 Ritschl’s estimate (Table 2) suggests that between 1913 and 1929, 
output in Germany’s metal-processing sector grew by roughly 20 per-
cent (or 30 percent if one adjusts for the loss of territory after World 
War I), which is roughly consistent with British data for the same pe-
riod in Charles Feinstein’s study.34 In contrast, Hoffmann’s index of 
production for the same industry yields an output increase of 70 percent 
27 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft.” 
28 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
29 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
30 Gehrig, “Eine Zeitreihe.” 
31 Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch.
32 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft.”
33 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
34 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” The decline of industrial output through territorial losses has 
been estimated by Wagenführ, “Industriewirtschaft,” to be around 10 percent. With an adjust-
ment for territorial losses, German machinery output may thus have grown by slightly over 30 
percent between 1913 and 1929. This would also be consistent with an estimate by the German 
machine industry association, the Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten (VDMA), Hand-
buch 1930. Feinstein, National Income.
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TABLE 2
TIME SERIES ESTIMATES OF OUTPUT IN GERMAN METAL PROCESSING 
Ritschl  Hoffmann
1913 100  100
1929 119.9  170.3
1935 100.5  163.9
Notes: All data are indices (1913 = 100) and refer to changing territory. Total metal processing 
also includes shipbuilding and cars. The Hoffmann index is estimated from wage bills. 
Sources: Ritschl, “Spurious Growth”; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
between 1913 and 1929.35 One reason is that Hoffmann calculated his es-
timate for this sector from the income side, using wage bills and assum-
ing constant wage shares in value added. This approach towards estimat-
ing output ignores the substantial increase in labor’s bargaining power in 
Germany after 1918. Ritschl showed that all available estimates of Ger-
man industrial output and national product except for Hoffmann’s output 
series imply a strong increase in wage shares between 1913 and 1929.36
Using the Wagenführ industrial production index, Broadberry and Ritschl 
found that the implied increase in industrial wage shares across World 
War I was similar to that implied by the British data.37 The resulting 
profit squeeze in German industry between 1913 and 1929 is a classical 
theme in German historiography that has generated a large literature, yet 
Hoffmann’s index merely assumes it away.38 As Ritschl shows, if in 
Hoffmann’s index of industrial production, the income estimate for metal 
processing is revised using contemporary data, the resulting aggregate in-
dex tracks Wagenführ’s index closely.39 The productivity discrepancies 
in extrapolated German productivity shown in Table 1 thus seem to rest 
largely on the assumptions about the metal processing industry. 
 Ritschl’s revisions were partly an attempt to find evidence that is in-
dependent of both the Hoffmann and the Wagenführ indices.40 The key 
35 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
36 Ritschl, “Zu hohe Löhne.” 
37 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft”; and Broadberry and Ritschl, “Real Wages.” 
38 Borchardt, “Decade.” An overview of existing estimates of industrial unit labor cost in 
interwar Germany is Spoerer, “German Net Investment.” Tax audit data on industrial profitabil-
ity have further confirmed the evidence of changing factor shares in the 1920s, see Spoerer, 
Scheingewinne.
39 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft.” The employment data 
underlying Hoffmann’s estimate have recently also come under attack, see Fremdling, “German 
Industrial Employment.”  
40 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth”; Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; and Wagenführ, “Die Indus-
triewirtschaft.” Wagenführ headed a group on industrial statistics at Berlin’s Institut für Kon-
junkturforschung. An updated index is included in Wagemann, ed., Konjunkturstatistisches
Handbuch. Tooze, Statistics, provides a history of this institution, which carried out business 
cycle research and conducted monthly industry surveys beginning in 1928. 
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element was constructing a new index of machine production for the pe-
riod between 1913 and 1928. This new series could then be aggregated 
with series from other industries in the metal working sector to provide 
a new output estimate of the sector as a whole. Recent archival findings 
by Fremdling make it possible to refine this calculation further, and to 
substantiate its central assumptions.41
 The German machine industry association, the Verein Deutscher 
Maschinenbau-Anstalten (VDMA), published sales figures for 1913 and 
from 1925 to 1928.42 In 1928 an official industry census for machine 
building yielded slightly lower numbers than the VDMA for the same 
year. Extrapolating backwards from the 1928 census using the deflated 
sales data and companion data from the VDMA, Ritschl arrived at 
slightly higher output growth in machinery than Wagenführ.43
 Archival data from the VDMA reported by Fremdling pin down the 
growth rate of machinery output between 1913 and 1928, as well as the 
1913 level (see Table 3).44 For the industries covered by his source, 
Fremdling finds sales in 1913 to be 2609.6 mill. M (see Table 3, column 
2), as opposed to the VDMA’s 2800 mill. M (see Table 3, column 1).45
The percentage discrepancy between both 1913 benchmarks exactly 
matches the percentage discrepancy between the VDMA’s own sales 
data for 1928 and the official census for that year (Table 3, column 3).46
This suggests that the 1928 machine industry census was conducted for 
the same reporting group of machine producers for which Fremdling 
worked out the 1913 benchmark.47
 If so, the VDMA figures in Table 3 (column 1) describe growth be-
tween these benchmarks correctly, while overstating levels in both 1913 
and 1928. The 1913 output within the reporting group of the 1928 ma-
chine census (Table 3, column 3) must then equal Fremdling’s bench-
mark value of 2609.6 mill. M (Table 3, column 2).48 If we deflate Table 
3 (column 3) by machinery prices (column 4), real output of machinery 
41 Fremdling, “Machine Building.” 
42 Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten (VDMA), Statistisches Handbuch.
43 VDMA, Die Deutsche Maschinenindustrie. Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” Wagenführ, “Die 
Industriewirtschaft.” By contrast, Gehrig, “Zeitreihe,” interpolated machinery output between 
the earlier VDMA figures and the census data for 1928, neglecting the difference between the 
VDMA and census levels in 1928. This procedure tended to underestimate the growth in ma-
chinery output between the VDMA benchmark for 1913 and the lower census benchmark for 
1928.
44 Fremdling, “Machine Building.” 
45 The VDMA estimate appears to have been derived from the export shares of VDMA’s 
members in 1913, as suspected by Fremdling, “Machine Building.” 
46 From Table 3 (columns 1, 2, and 3), we obtain 2,609.6 / 2,800 = 0.932 for the 1913 bench-
marks and 3,728 / 4,000 = 0.932 for the 1928 census and VDMA sales figures. 
47 Fremdling, “Machine Building.” 
48 Ibid. 
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TABLE 3
RECALCULATING OUTPUT IN GERMAN MACHINE BUILDING 
 Nominal Sales   
 VDMA   1928 Census  Real Output 
million 
marks / 
reichsmarks  Index  
Fremdling
million
marks 
million 
marks /
reichsmarks Index
Prices
Index
Revised
Index
Ritschl
Index
Wagenführ
Index
 (1)    (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
1909     1,738.2   106.2 62.7  63.9 
1913 2,800  100  2,609.6 2,609.6 100 100 100 100 100 
1928 4,000  142.9   3,728 142.9 144.8 98.7 97.8 94.1 
Notes: Ritschl’s and Wagenführ’s real output figures are shown for comparison to the revised 
estimate. 
Sources: Calculated from Ritschl, “Spurious Growth”; and Fremdling, “Machine Building.” 
VDMA, Statistisches Handbuch. Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft.”
(column 5) is seen to decline slightly between 1913 and 1928. The de-
cline is very close to Ritschl’s data.49 By contrast, Wagenführ’s esti-
mates suggest a larger decline between 1913 and 1928.50
 Fremdling’s archival data thus confirm the existing revisions of 
Hoffmann’s estimates for metal working during the 1913 to 1928 pe-
riod.51 In other words, if “Hoffmann’s tales” are replaced with actual 
data, the traditional picture reappears: profits in metal processing were 
much larger before the war than afterwards, and the output of this in-
dustry increased only moderately between 1913 to 1928, instead of 
shooting up.52 In any case, reverting to the original Hoffmann data no 
longer seems to be an option. There is solid evidence on output in the 
industries in question across World War I, and it tells a different story. 
Any time series projection of comparative productivity simply has to 
deal with this evidence. 
 Further revisions suggest themselves for the 1930s from a reassess-
ment of Germany’s 1936 industry census by Fremdling and Staeglin.53
According to their results, the production of military aircraft, along with 
some minor armament industries, is missing from the industry aggregates 
49 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth,” table 3 (column v), already obtains this estimate but then dis-
cards it in favor of a compromise estimate of 97.8 index points for 1928. This would accommo-
date the lower 1928 value of 94.1 index points of Wagenführ, “Industriewirtschaft.” 
50 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft.”
51 Fremdling, “Machine Building.” Hoffmann, Das Wachstum. Table 3 (column 2) also pro-
vides Fremdling’s sales data for 1909. Deflating yields an output estimate (Table 3, column 4) 
of 62.7, which is close to the Wagenführ’s index of 63.9 for the same year. Thus, the revisions 
broadly confirm Wagenführ’s index of machinery production, except around 1928. 
52 Fremdling, “German Industrial Employment.” 
53 Fremdling and Staeglin, “Die Industrieerhebung.” 
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TABLE 4
GERMAN AIRCRAFT AND ARMAMENT INDUSTRY IN 1936 
     
Output 1935 
(1913 = 100) 
  Employment Sales (RM) 
Output
per Capita Unadjusted  Corrected 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Aircraft  145,543 883,000,000 6,066.9   
Handguns  22,308 73,903,395 3,312.9   
Total not in census  167,851 956,903,395 5,700.9  
Machine building  593,093 3,770,055,495 6,356.6 80.9  
Machines and 
armament  760,944 4,726,958,890 6,212.0  103.8 
Shipbuilding  79,887 499,810,437 6,256.5 61.5 61.5 
Motor vehicles  112,375 1,441,837,963 12,830.6 815.5 815.5 
Electrical 
engineering  325,433 2,315,458,540 71,15.0 123.1 123.1 
Metal processing 
industry  100.5 113.6 
Sources: Columns 1–3: German Federal Archives, R 3102/3028, R3102/3540-44. Column 4: 
Table 2, Table 3. Shipbuilding and motor vehicles: Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” Column 5: Ag-
gregated using the weights in Ritschl, “Spurious Growth,” adjusted for armament. 
of this census, and is instead included in the construction sector. The in-
dustries in question employed about 168 thousand people in 1936 and 
generated sales of about 956 mill. RM. For aircraft industry with 145 
thousand people at work, gross output was 883 mill. RM or 6,067 RM 
per capita.54
 As Table 4 reveals, in 1936 the aircraft and small firearms industries 
together were slightly smaller than the auto industry in terms of output, 
but somewhat larger in terms of employment.55 Employment in these 
armament industries was about 28.3 percent of employment in machine 
building, with slightly lower productivity. There is good reason to as-
sume that these industries are missing from the traditional Wagenführ 
index and its continuation in the IfK publications—which would, after 
all, explain why Hoffmann chose such a roundabout way of estimating 
output in the metal-processing industries.56
 With the information now at hand, Hoffmann’s income-side estimate 
for the metal-processing industries can be replaced by an output esti-
mate based on the 1935/6 benchmark.57 To add aircraft and armament 
54 German Federal Archives, R3102/3028.  
55 This would suggest that in terms of employment creation, the Third Reich was probably 
less of a story about cars, roads, and the autobahn, as in Overy, “Cars,” but rather about bomber 
aircraft and runways.  
56 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft”; and Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
57 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
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TABLE 5
RECALCULATING OUTPUT IN GERMAN METAL PROCESSING 
    Total Metal Processing 
  Machines  Including Aircraft  Ritschl  Hoffmann 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1891 20.3  20.3   25.8 
1895 24.9  25.1   28.1 
1901 39.5  41.5   45.3 
1907 64.2  62.9   70.6 
1911 70.7  73.3   85.2 
1913  100  100 100  100 
1925 75.1  88.2 84.4  131.4 
1929  100.7  121.2 119.9  170.3 
1935  103.8  113.6 100.5  163.9 
Note: All data refer to changing territory. Ritschl and Hoffmann figures are included for com-
parison.
Sources and Methods: (1) Revised estimate. Data until 1929 calculated as in Table 3, column 5. 
Data for 1935 from Table 4, column 5. (2) Revised estimate. See text for method of calculation. 
industry to the index of industrial production for 1936, machine build-
ing seems to be the proper choice. Also, it seems plausible to assume 
that in the mid-1930s, machinery and aircraft production grew roughly 
at the same rates. If so, the index (with 1913 = 100) for machine build-
ing for 1935 increases by 28.3 percent, that is, from 80.9 to 103.8 (see 
Table 4).58 This neglects aircraft production in 1913, which however 
was still small.59
 We can combine the evidence from Table 4 and the resulting new 
machinery series (Table 5, column 1) to recalculate output in metal-
processing industry for key years from 1881 to 1935. Calculation of this 
series follows the same methods as in Table 2, column (5) until 1929, 
and includes the revised 1935 entry from Table 4, column (5). This se-
ries is then aggregated with data on electrical industry, cars, and ship-
building to yield a production index for metal-processing industry, us-
ing a procedure described by Ritschl.60 This revised series (in Table 5,
58 Inspection of the net value added data from the 1936 census substantiates the revision. 
Value added in total industry (including construction, where the armament data were hidden, 
and utilities) in the census was 34.185 bn RM at 1936 prices, or 27.305 bn RM at 1913 prices 
(author’s own calculations from German Federal Archives, R3102. The GNP deflator is calcu-
lated from Ritschl, Krise und Konjunktur, appendix B. Net value added for the same classifica-
tion of industry in Hoffmann, Wachstum, p. 455, is virtually identical at 27.286 bn RM. 
59 Output in 1909 was seven zeppelins and 73 “flying machines,” see Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, “Produktionserhebungen.” Combined sales in 1909 amounted to 1.5 mill. M. 
This is less than 2 percent of sales in the motor industry in that year. Given the very high growth 
rates of the latter, it seems unlikely that the share of aircraft industry in total motor industry far 
exceeded 10 percent in 1913. 
60 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
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TABLE 6
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDICES FOR GERMANY 
(1935 = 100) 
  Revised Hoffmann Index     
  New  Ritschl  Wagenführ  Hoffmann 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1881 25.6  26.5    23.1 
1891 35.9  37.1    33.4 
1895 44.4  45.9  39.8  40.5 
1901 52.2  54.0  56.6  47.5 
1907 70.5  73.0  73.6  64.4 
1911 80.0  82.8  88.0  73.7 
1913 92.1  94.9  97.5  80.6 
1925 86.4  89.4  88.0  84.7 
1929 104.6  107.8  103.8  100.1 
1935 100  100.0  100  100 
Sources and Methods: All series for categories comparable to Feinstein, National Income. See 
the text for calculation of the revised Hoffmann series. All data refer to changing territory. 
column 2) is one index point higher than Ritschl’s index (in Table 5, 
column 3) for 1929, and 13 index points higher for 1935.61 It implies 
cumulative growth of German metal-processing industry from 1913 to 
1935 of 13 percent, compared to 64 percent in the Hoffmann data (in 
Table 5, column 4).62
 The new series can then be substituted into the Hoffmann index of 
industrial production.63 Table 6 shows the new revision alongside 
Ritschl’s previous estimate as well as those of Hoffmann and Wagen-
führ’s original indices.64
 Both the new revision and Ritschl’s previous version track Wagen-
führ’s figures closely between 1913 and 1929.65 The new revision and 
Wagenführ’s seem to agree on the relative levels of 1929 and 1935, that 
is, before and after the depression, while Hoffmann’s estimate over-
states the speed of recovery, and Ritschl’s previous series understates 
it.66 The net effect continues to be a drastic downward revision of 
Hoffmann’s growth estimate between the benchmarks of 1907 and 
1935. Cumulative growth in this period according to the new revision is 
41.8 percent. This is up from 36 percent in the series of Wagenführ and 
61 Ibid. 
62 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
63 The procedures are the same as in Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
64 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth”; Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; and Wagenführ, “Die Indus-
triewirtschaft.” Because details about the index weights in Wagenführ, “Industriewirtschaft,” 
are unavailable, it is impossible to revise his index in the same way for the years before 1914. 
65 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth”; and Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft.”
66 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft”; Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; and Ritschl, “Spurious 
Growth.”
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37 percent in the earlier revision of Hoffmann’s series by Ritschl.67 By 
contrast, Hoffmann’s series implies a higher figure of 55.2 percent.68
 As a result of these revisions, the backward extrapolations of output 
and productivity from 1935 to 1907 will be slightly lower than the 
Wagenführ index or Ritschl’s earlier data would imply.69 However, it is 
still much higher than the backward extrapolation using Hoffmann’s 
figures.70 Before the backward extrapolations are discussed in more de-
tail, the next section will revise the 1907 benchmark. 
REVISITING THE 1907 PRODUCTIVITY BENCHMARK 
 The existing Anglo-German productivity benchmarks of Fremdling 
and B & B are partly based on censuses undertaken in both countries in 
1907.71 Yet as I will argue, there is a serious mismatch in employment 
coverage between these two censuses, which leads to an overestimate of 
German employment and an underestimate of productivity. The British 
industry census of 1907 provides rich details on physical production, 
gross output, and value added, but is considerably less detailed on em-
ployment.72 In terms of coverage, the British census omits one-person 
establishments, small firms employing only men, as well as helping 
family members, and an unknown percentage of outworkers in cottage 
industries.73 In contrast, the German workplace census of 1907 provided 
a full count of all employment. For comparable categories, the shortfall 
of the British census is between 25 and 30 percent.74
 Not all German data used in the B & B productivity benchmark are 
from the workplace census. B & B rely also on annual industry surveys, 
as well as statistics on the output of taxable goods.75 For a rather limited 
range of industries, the annual surveys provide revenues, sometimes 
physical output, several cost items, and in some cases, employment.76
The tax statistics provide output figures for industries like beer, sugar, 
67 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft”; and Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
68 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
69 Wagenführ, “Die Industriewirtschaft”; and Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
70 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum.
71 Fremdling, “Productivity Comparison.” 
72 See Board of Trade, Final Report.
73 Ibid., p. iv, pp. 8–12. 
74 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Berufs- und Volkszählung.” 
75 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1910, Kaiserliches Statistisches 
Amt, “Berufs- und Volkszählung.” 
76 Employment was recorded in all industries surveyed. However, the published version of 
the survey reports employment only for some of the industries included. For the industries that 
can be matched with their British counterparts, these are mostly the chemical and metal indus-
tries, as well as leather tanning. 
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tobacco, and salt. For all industries, employment data by firm size are 
available from the 1907 workplace census. 
 The gaps of the German data cause problems of mutual compatibility. 
Participation in the industry surveys was limited to firms included in the 
national disability insurance scheme. This excluded Germany’s large 
crafts sector, as well as most small-scale establishments. Comparison 
with the firm size data in the 1907 census reveals that the surveys were 
often limited to firms with 50 employees or more. In contrast, the Ger-
man 1907 workplace census is a full count of employment in the private 
sector, and provides a fairly detailed breakup of employment by estab-
lishments and lines of production. 
 In their productivity benchmark for 1907, B & B adhere to the indus-
try surveys for Germany whenever possible, otherwise drawing on the 
tax statistics for additional output data and on the 1907 workplace cen-
sus for employment. Their preferred option is to compare physical out-
put per capita, or alternatively real output as deflated by unit value ra-
tios. The first column of Table 7 reproduces the results of their 
comparison. It shows a substantial German productivity lead in chemi-
cal industry and metal making, while the United Kingdom is seen to 
lead in textiles as well as in food, drink, and tobacco. On the whole, B 
& B find a 5 percent productivity lead in German manufacturing over 
Britain. Aggregating over manufacturing and mining, B & B find Ger-
man industrial productivity around 1907 to have been a mere 2 percent 
higher than in Britain.77
 Table 7 also reports two new productivity benchmarks for 1907, with 
substantial upward revisions over the B & B estimate. Averaging over 
these revisions, German manufacturing productivity was about 25 per-
cent ahead of Britain. For industry including mining, Germany’s pro-
ductivity lead was probably a few percentage points lower. 
 Corrections and revisions to the B & B productivity benchmark seem 
advisable for three reasons. First, some of the choices made by B & B in 
calculating their data for Germany would seem problematic, and a 
number of apparent errors need to be dealt with (see the Appendix for a 
more detailed discussion). To highlight but a few points, one issue is 
that not all German data in the B & B benchmark are from 1907, but 
rather from industry surveys for 1908 or 1910. Weighed by employ-
ment, these later data dominate their estimate, with a 68 percent share
for data from 1908 and another 4 percentage points for the 1910 data,  
77 All comparative productivity estimates shown in Table 7 are based on Fisher indices using 
German and U.K. employment weights. Details on these weights are provided in Appendix Ta-
ble 1. The productivity results themselves are shown in greater detail in Appendix Table 2. 
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TABLE 7
ANGLO-GERMAN BENCHMARK COMPARISON OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY, 
1907
(United Kingdom = 100) 
 Broadberry and Burhop  Revised 
  (1)  (2) 
General chemicals  126.6  134.3
Coke  98.9  123.5 
 Chemicals and allied   113.9  130.5
Iron and steel 137.8  144.0
Nonferrous metals  157.9  221.5
Motor vehicles 89.7  135.2
 Metals and engineering   139.2  152.1
Cotton  85.6  128.4 
Silk  74.9  93.7 
Leather  67.8  100.8 
 Textiles and clothing   82.3  121.7
Brewing  90.5  102.7 
Tobacco  28.3  38.4 
Sugar  47.3  47.3 
 Food, drink, and tobacco   66.9  73.0
Cement  108.1  124.2 
  Total manufacturing   105.0  128.0
Salt mining 57.8  130.1
Coal mining 78.5  95.5
Iron ore mining  91.0  129.8
 Mining   78.7  97.9
  Total industry   101.8  124.5
Sources and Methods: See Broadberry and Burhop, “Comparative Productivity.” See also Ap-
pendix Table 1 and Appendix Table 2.   
respectively. Since the chemical industry and iron and steel went into 
recession after 1907, their productivity in 1908 and 1910 as reported in 
B & B is likely to understate the 1907 levels. Yet the German surveys 
do provide data on many of the same industries for the benchmark year 
of 1907. Inserting the 1907 data whenever possible, I find that the pro-
ductivity estimates increase across the board. For the auto industry, I 
use the 1907 data in the German source used by B & B, and find pro-
ductivity to be higher than in Britain.78
For the textile industries, B & B aggregate over employment in 
spinning and weaving on the basis of output data in spinning alone, as 
78 B & B deviate from their preferred methodology for iron and steel, as well as nonferrous 
metals, and base their comparison on unit value ratios for different varieties. As the historical 
categories of steel are often inconsistent, my estimates are instead based on physical output net 
of pig iron output, however with very similar results. I also estimate productivity in nonferrous 
metals from physical output, which results in a slight downward correction. 
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comparable output data for weaving are absent. This would probably 
be innocuous in the absence of foreign trade in yarn. However, given 
that Britain was a heavy exporter and Germany both an importer and 
exporter of yarn (albeit of different qualities), this procedure is likely 
to be misleading, as domestic yarn output is no longer a good input 
measure of output in weaving. Thus I rely on spinning alone.79 More-
over, the B & B employment data for Germany appear to include sub-
stantial employment in trade rather than in production, which inflates 
the denominator of their German productivity estimate. My recon-
struction arrives at distinctly lower levels of employment in the spin-
ning industry. 
 Major corrections apply to tobacco, where B & B capture only 30 
percent of domestic tobacco supply in Germany, and to salt mining, 
where B & B report salt works instead of mines for Germany. Appendix 
Table 2 (Revision Level 1) reports my version of the B & B employ-
ment and productivity benchmark. As a result of these corrections, 
German comparative productivity around the benchmark rises to 112 
percent of the British level in manufacturing, or 108 percent in total in-
dustry including mining.80
 A second source of revisions comes in through differences in em-
ployment coverage between the German industry surveys and the 1907 
census. B & B adhere to the survey data of employment in chemical in-
dustry, the metal and engineering trades, leather, and mining. However, 
these employment data can be misleading when it comes to productivity 
measurement, because of employment in multi-product firms. The sur-
veys follow a firm-oriented concept and take a shortcut by allocating 
employment to the major product line in the main establishment of a 
firm. This implied counting all employment in these establishments to-
wards the main product. As a consequence, steel workers would be in-
cluded in the employment of coal producers and vice versa, depending 
on the respective firm’s major product. This resulted in over-reporting 
of employment in some of these industries.  
 By contrast, the 1907 workplace census followed a product-oriented 
concept. In order to provide a clean breakdown of employment in multi-
product firms, employees were asked individually to report their em-
ployment by the relevant product category on the census date. On bal-
ance, census employment levels are therefore lower than in the industry 
survey data. To the same extent, the industry survey data understate 
79 Additional adjustments come in through the need to carefully balance industry classifica-
tions to ensure comparability with the British data. In addition, some apparent errors of mostly 
minor importance have been corrected. Details are reported in the Appendix. 
80 See the Appendix for details. 
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productivity, not at a firm level but per unit of specific products.81 In es-
sence, they reflect the high degree of vertical integration between Ger-
man coal and steel, and of horizontal integration in chemical industry. 
 Related difficulties exist in the British census data. To deal with these 
problems, B & B break down employment by the relevant product’s 
percentage in value added.82 The German census employment data pro-
vide this breakdown directly (while a breakdown by value added is of-
ten not possible). 
 This discrepancy gives rise to a revision of the B & B benchmark that 
goes beyond mere adjustments. Revision Level 2 in Appendix Tables 1 
and 2 shows the results of using census employment whenever possible. 
Replacing the (firm-specific) survey data on employment with the 
(product-specific) workplace census data on employment leads to up-
ward revisions of productivity in the chemical and metals industries, as 
well as in mining. As a result of this revision, comparative productivity 
in German manufacturing rises to 120 percent of British levels. For in-
dustry including mining, the estimate is around 118 percent.83
 A third source of revisions derives from the different treatment of 
very small enterprises in the British and German data. The British in-
dustry census of 1907 excluded one-person establishments, family help-
ers and some outworkers, and small establishments of less than 10 em-
ployees where only men were working. The census estimates the 
resulting employment pitfall at roughly 25 percent.84 In contrast, the 
German workplace census of 1907 aimed at the total working popula-
tion. The difference leads to a mismatch between the censoring points of 
the firm size distributions in the German workplace census and the Brit-
ish industry census. This mismatch is insignificant in chemical and most 
of metal industry as well as in mining, where large firms prevailed. It is 
more of a problem in the food, drink and tobacco industries in the index, 
where small-scale establishments were quantitatively important. 
 Evidently, the employment figures cannot simply be adjusted without 
taking care of the output figures as well. For the German output data 
from the industry survey, this is not a problem. In the surveys, only the 
81 Use of the employment census data also leads to changes in the employment weighing 
scheme, shifting the weights towards more productive industries. 
82 In an industry producing 60 percent of its value added in steel and 40 percent in coal, this 
would imply splitting employment between the two products in the same proportion. An unre-
solved problem in the British census methodology is that industries are split up according to the 
firms’ main line of product. Products like coal or steel thus appear in the survey several times, 
and allocation of employment between main lines of production and the side products seems far 
less than obvious. 
83 Note that as Revision Level 2 just removes double counting from the (firm-specific rather 
than product-specific) employment data, no adjustment of output is necessary. 
84 See Board of Trade, Final Report, p. 8f. 
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larger firms were included. Hence the output estimate does not need to 
be adjusted when removing the smaller firms from the employment 
data.85 By contrast, the statistics for these taxable goods include all le-
gally produced output, and hence also the output of small establish-
ments. I follow the British 1907 census, as well as de Jong, Fremdling, 
and Timmer for the German 1936 census, in assuming that small estab-
lishments were 20 percent less productive than larger firms.86
 Textiles present some special problems. The only product categories 
comparable to Britain in 1907 seem to be cotton and silk spinning. The 
German surveys for cotton spinning cover only 398 out of 1062 firms 
counted in the 1907 census.87 In that census, 379 firms were reported to 
have 50 or more employees. This implies that neither the smaller firms 
nor their output were counted in the surveys. The surveys did, however, 
include the output of outworkers and cottage industries working for the 
firms surveyed.88 I have therefore adjusted employment in cotton spin-
ning by excluding only small firms. Outworkers in cottage industries, 
who accounted for roughly 8 percent of employment in cotton spinning, 
are left in the sample. Very similar adjustments apply to the smaller silk 
spinning industry. 
 Appendix Tables 1 and 2 report the results from adjusting for firm 
size in the German employment and output data. Revision Level 3 sub-
tracts employment in establishments of five persons or less (again, ex-
cept for outworkers in textiles) from the German employment data. The 
resulting coverage is probably slightly narrower than its British coun-
terpart. The resulting estimate “Revision Level 3” in Appendix Tables 1 
and 2 then provides an upper bound for productivity. For manufactur-
ing, this upper-bound estimate suggests a 28 percent productivity lead 
for Germany in 1907. With mining, German industry was up to 25 per-
cent ahead of the United Kingdom. 
 In sum then, the revised productivity benchmark for 1907 yields sub-
stantially higher German productivity. About 30 percent of the increase 
can be attributed to minor corrections and improvements to the B & B 
benchmark. The other 70 percent stem from adjustments made because 
of mismatches in employment coverage between the British industry 
census, the German employment census, and the German industry sur-
veys. Once employment coverage in the two countries is put on the 
same footing, the traditional picture of a substantial German productiv-
85 We keep in mind that we discarded the survey employment data in the first place because 
of double-counting, and used the census employment data instead. 
86 de Jong, Fremdling, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing.” 
87 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Produktionserhebungen,” p. 69. 
88 See the notes in ibid., p. III. 
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ity lead reappears. However, Germany’s sectoral productivity perform-
ance in 1907 continues to look very uneven. While Germany clearly led 
in the chemical and metal trades, German productivity in the food in-
dustries was very low. To this extent, the basic findings of Broadberry’s 
earlier work on Germany’s comparative advantage are preserved.89
PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: RESOLUTION OF THE 
PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLE 
 Both the revised time series evidence and the revised 1907 bench-
mark can now be fed back into the productivity comparisons of Table 1. 
 Table 8 recalculates the productivity comparisons of Table 1, both 
along the time series dimension, shown in the upper panel, and for the 
benchmarks, shown in the lower panel. The new extrapolation (row 3) 
is based on the revision of Hoffmann’s German industrial production 
index from Table 6, which incorporates the evidence on the aircraft in-
dustry by de Jong, Fremdling, and Timmer, and the conclusions of the 
previous section for 1907.90 The revisions to the benchmarks have a 
double effect. Including the hidden armament industries for 1935 lowers 
German productivity slightly. Adjusting the German employment statis-
tics for 1907 (Table 8, row 8) boosts German productivity substantially. 
 As for the revision to the time series evidence discussed previously, it 
has two effects. First, it reduces the decline of industrial output between 
1929 and 1935: once one accounts for the Heinkel bomber, Germany’s 
industrial recovery from the Great Depression is more complete than 
suggested in my earlier revision.91 Second, the revision to the time se-
ries also implies somewhat lower productivity levels relative to Britain 
before 1929. As a net effect, the revised time-series estimate of Ger-
many’s productivity lead over Britain in 1907 (Table 8, row 3) is 26 
percent, down from 31 percent in the unadjusted estimates of Table 1 
above, and from 50 percent in B & B. 
 If we combine the revised time series extrapolation and the revised 
productivity benchmark for 1907, there is no longer any discrepancy 
left: the time series evidence suggests a 26 percent productivity lead, 
while the benchmark suggests that German manufacturing was between 
20 percent (Revision Level 2) and 28 percent (Revision Level 3) ahead. 
In other words, the Anglo-German productivity puzzle disappears. 
89 Broadberry, Productivity Race.
90 de Jong, Fremdling, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing.” 
91 Ritschl, “Spurious Growth.” 
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TABLE 8
REVISED ESTIMATES OF COMPARATIVE PRODUCTIVITY IN GERMAN 
MANUFACTURING 
(United Kingdom = 100) 
1895  1907 1929  1935
Panel a: Backward Projections 
1 Broadberry using Hoffmann         
  - my replication -  101.8  115.4  107.1  102  
2 B & B using my earlier series         
  - my replication -  115.3  130.7  115.4  102  
3 New revision  110.8  125.6  111.3  101.5 
Panel B: Productivity Benchmarks 
4 Broadberry and Fremdling        102 
5 Fremdling    95     
6 de Jong, Fremdling and Timmer        105 
7 Broadberry and Burhop    105     
8 New benchmark    120–128     
Notes: All data refer to changing territory. Data exclude mining, utilities, and construction. See 
Tables 1 and 6 for details on the backward projections. See Table 7 and Appendix Table 2 for 
revised 1907 benchmark. 
 All the evidence examined here indicates that Germany enjoyed a 
growing productivity lead in manufacturing over Britain prior to World 
War I. Given the paucity of comparable data for 1907 and the inevitable 
pitfalls in the historical time series, it is hard to know whether the lead 
was closer to 20 or 30 percent. However, it seems safe to rule out ex-
treme scenarios such as Germany trailing Britain in manufacturing 
around 1907 or instead forging ahead at 50 percent, as one of the calcu-
lations in B & B suggested. 
CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The Anglo-German industrial productivity puzzle of the early 1900s 
has a resolution. Careful reexamination of the evidence on Germany 
suggests revisions to both the time projections and the productivity 
benchmarks. Application of both methods suggest that in manufactur-
ing, Germany had a substantial productivity lead over Britain on the eve 
of World War I, albeit with an uneven sectoral distribution. 
 Previous benchmark estimates, last proposed by Broadberry and Bur-
hop, suggested a very small German productivity lead over Britain in 
1907, or none at all.92 At the same time, backward extrapolations from a 
1935 benchmark implied an implausibly large productivity lead of 50 
percent for 1907. This was the Anglo-German industrial productivity 
92 Broadberry and Burhop, “Comparative Productivity.” 
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puzzle. This article has resolved the puzzle. It does so by undertaking 
further revisions to the German time series evidence, based on Frem-
dling and Staeglin’s discovery of armament industry data hidden in 
Germany’s industrial census in 1936.93 This article also reworks the 
1907 benchmark to take into account differences in employment cover-
age between the British and German data. 
 With these revisions in place, the Anglo-German productivity puzzle 
all but disappears. German manufacturing in 1907 turns out to have 
been 20 to 28 percent ahead of Britain if measured by the benchmark 
comparison method, or 26 percent ahead if measured by backward ex-
trapolation. This puts traditional interpretations of German industrial 
dynamics prior to World War I firmly back on the map.94 At the same 
time, however, the picture that emerges is very much that of a dual 
economy, as is already implicit in Broadberry’s earlier work: while 
chemical industry, metals, and engineering appear to have been quite far 
ahead, the light industries in sectors closer to agriculture were not.95 Yet 
the overall picture I obtain of these industries is less unfavorable to 
Germany than the data of Broadberry and Burhop would suggest.96 This 
article also confirms that Germany underwent a remarkable slowdown 
in growth and productivity across World War I, as described by Knut 
Borchardt.97 The implication is that Hoffmann’s series (which has been 
employed by Angus Maddison and others), substantially overstates 
Germany’s industrial and aggregate output growth after World War I.98
 Further research should concentrate on a full recalculation of a Ger-
man industrial production index, combining the various existing revi-
sions with the available archival data. Still, the Anglo-German indus-
trial productivity puzzle appears to be resolved, given the information 
currently available. 
93 Fremdling and Staeglin, “Die Industrieerhebung.” 
94 As in Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness; or Landes, Unbound Prometheus.
95 Broadberry, Productivity Race.
96 Broadberry and Burhop, “Comparative Productivity.” 
97 Borchardt, Perspectives.
98 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy and World Econ-
omy: A Millennial Perspective.
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Appendix: Data Sources and Methods Underlying 
the Revised 1907 Benchmark 
GENERAL REMARKS 
 Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Table 2 report the Broadberry and Burhop bench-
mark productivity comparison for 1907, along with three revisions.99 Appendix Ta-
ble 1 provides employment levels and index weights, Appendix Table 2 shows com-
parative productivity. The British data are from the 1907 U.K. production census.100
The German data are from industry surveys of production in Kaiserliches Statistisches 
Amt, from the workplace census of 1907, and from output data on taxable goods.101
Coverage of employment differs considerably between the German and the U.K. data, 
as well as between the various different German data. This gives rise to a series of re-
visions.
 Revision Level 1 is a corrected version of the B & B estimate, without adjustment 
of employment coverage. 
 Revision Level 2 is based on 1907 German workplace census employment. Entries 
show all employment including outworkers in cottage industries. As most of the Ger-
man output data were sampled only from medium- to large-size firms, Revision Level 
2 underreports German productivity in most sectors. Due to wider employment cover-
age than in the British data, it also underreports German comparative productivity. 
 Revision Level 3 excludes firms with five persons or fewer (but not any workers in 
cottage industry) from the German employment data. This aims to establish compara-
ble levels of coverage with the U.K. data, which exclude one-person firms, all-male 
establishments with up to ten employees, and an unknown percentage of outworkers in 
cottage industries. For those German industries (mostly taxable goods) where all out-
put was reported, output in Appendix Table 2 is adjusted accordingly, assuming the 
excluded employment categories were 20 percent less productive than the rest. No 
output adjustment is made to the production survey data, thus some underreporting of 
productivity in the respective sectors is still likely. 
General Chemicals 
 Broadberry and Burhop (hereafter B & B) report German data for 1908, which they 
take from an industry survey.102 For sulphuric acid, data are also available for the cen-
sus year of 1907.103 These data are consistent with the survey for 1908. Product-
specific employment data in Appendix Table 1 are from the 1907 workplace census.104
The U.K. data are from the Board of Trade.105
99 Broadberry and Burhop, “Comparative Productivity.” 
100 See Board of Trade, Final Report.
101 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, industry surveys in “Die Ergebnisse,” workplace cen-
sus in “Berufs- und Volkszählung,” and taxable goods in Statistisches Jahrbuch 1910. 
102 Broadberry and Burhop, “Comparative Productivity.” Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Die 
Ergebnisse,” p. 59 ff. 
103 See, for example, Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1909, p. 99. 
104 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Berufs- und Volkszählung.” 
105 Board of Trade, Final Report.
Anglo-German Industrial Productivity 557 
Coke
 The employment figures differ considerably across sources. The production surveys in 
Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt show 24,535 employed in 1908, and the 1907 census has 
only 15,632 in the same category.106 However, the (firm-specific) survey categories in-
clude significant output of joint and related products such as tar and several varieties of 
gas. Hence their employment category is also wider and includes these lines of production 
as well. In contrast, the workplace census provides narrower (product-specific) employ-
ment concepts, which are to be preferred. Revision Levels 2 and 3 in Appendix Table 1 
and Appendix Table 2 are based on the census employment data. Labor productivity 
growth according to the industry surveys averaged 5 percent per year from 1908 to 1911. 
To obtain productivity for 1907, I calculate output in 1908 into employment in 1907 and 
adjust for 5 percent productivity growth per annum. The resulting figure is 1384.4 metric 
tonnes of coke per capita of census employment in 1907, or 123.5 percent of British pro-
ductivity levels. U.K. data (which exclude tar and gas) are from Board of Trade.107
Iron and Steel 
 B & B’s productivity comparison rests on unit value comparisons for major sub-
groups of this industry. As historical distinctions between the various groups of iron 
and steel are highly arbitrary, the preferred method of comparison is physical output 
and productivity, subtracting the inputs of pig iron. German data for 1907 from 
Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1909, p. 98) provide output along with employment 
following the survey concept.108 Results are very close to the B & B estimate. U.K. 
data are from the Board of Trade.109
Nonferrous Metals 
 B & B’s productivity comparison rests on only two products, unwrought copper and un-
refined zinc. The same industries produced a much wider range of products. However, the 
British sources do not provide employment estimates for the various product categories 
separately.110 German 1907 data on output and employment for the relevant product cate-
gories are available from Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt.111 The data in Appendix Table 2, 
Revision Level 1, report a conservative comparison of physical productivity. Here, copper, 
zinc, and lead output from various different industries in the 1907 U.K. census are added 
up, without being able to add up the relevant employment categories as well.112 The result-
ing comparative productivity estimate is slightly lower than the one by B & B. The much 
higher productivity level in Appendix Table 2, Revision Level 3, results from subtracting 
employment in small establishments of five persons or fewer, and would be consistent with 
a physical productivity comparison for lead, zinc, and copper sampled from the industries 
included by B & B. For these three metals together, German productivity according to the 
surveys in Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt was 235 percent of U.K. levels.113
106 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Die Ergebnisse,” pp. 4–6, for 1908. See Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1909, p. 76, for the 1907 census. 
107 Board of Trade, Final Report, p. 69f. 
108 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1909, p. 98. 
109 Board of Trade, Final Report, pp. 171–75. 
110 See Board of Trade, Final Report, p. 264ff. 
111 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1909, p. 98. 
112 Board of Trade, Final Report.
113 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Die Ergebnisse.” 
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Motor Vehicles 
 The German data underlying the comparison in B&B are for 1909, not 1907 as 
claimed in the text. Overall employment (12,688) and value of output (29.3 mill. M) 
for 1907 are available from the same source.114 My estimate employs information 
about relative unit values from 1909, and combines it with the 1907 employment and 
physical output data in the different categories. The U.K. data are from the Board of 
Trade.115
Cotton 
 Output data for cotton spinning are available for both the United Kingdom and Ger-
many. For weaving, the British census only has a surface measure of output, while the 
German data are in tonnes. The British sources provide employment only for spinning 
and weaving combined.116 B & B adjust their U.K. employment data to spinning by the 
ratio of gross value in cotton spinning to that in the whole industry. We adopt this ad-
justed estimate. Output data for Germany for 1907 are from the industry surveys of 
Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt.117 B & B’s employment data, taken from the 1907 cen-
sus in Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, include an apparent typo (“Bigognespinnerei” in 
the German source, whose employment they record as 9,493, instead of 6,493 as in the 
published sources).118 Inserting the correct employment level, the corrected productivity 
estimate (“Revision Level 1”) for cotton spinning in Appendix Table 2 is 106 percent 
instead of 85 percent of British levels. Moreover, B & B count an additional 21,515 em-
ployed (most likely in retailing) that I could not allocate to any category of cotton spin-
ning. Subtracting these from employment, I arrive at the census employment estimate of 
productivity (“Revision Level 2”) in Appendix Table 2, which includes outworkers and 
cottage industries in spinning. Productivity according to this employment concept is 129 
percent of British levels. To arrive at categories comparable to the U.K. data, Revision 
Level 3 results from subtracting employment in very small establishments (but not in 
cottage industries) from the German employment data. 
Silk 
 For silk, B & B again aggregate over spinning and weaving on the basis of silk yarn 
output. Given the absence of comparable output data for weaving, our estimate rests 
on spinning alone. Following B & B’s procedure for cotton, we adjust British em-
ployment by the share of spinning in reported industry value. German output data for 
1907 are from the industry surveys.119 As in B & B, German employment in the indus-
try is from the 1907 census.120 Again, my reconstruction of the German employment 
data leads to substantially lower levels than in B & B. Inserting these data yields the 
corrected productivity estimate (Revision Level 1) in silk spinning in Appendix Ta-
ble 2. Further adjustments (Revision Level 3) result from eliminating employment in 
establishments with 5 persons or less (but not in the cottage industries) 
114 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Die Ergebnisse,” p. 64ff. 
115 Board of Trade, Final Report, p. 203f. 
116 See Board of Trade, Final Report, p. 337ff. 
117 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Die Ergebnisse.” 
118 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1910 and “Berufs- und Volks-
zählung.” 
119 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Die Ergebnisse,” p. 64ff. 
120 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Berufs- und Volkszählung.” 
Anglo-German Industrial Productivity 559 
Leather 
 British data in the B & B estimate refer to tanning only, while their German data cover 
a wider category. Our estimate compares only tanning, and adjusts British employment by 
the relation between gross output in tanning and the surveyed industry total. German out-
put data for 1907 are from the industry surveys.121 The surveys also provide employment 
data, which enter our corrected version (Revision Level 1) of the B & B productivity es-
timate in Appendix Table 2. Census employment is again slightly lower and forms the ba-
sis for the census estimate of productivity (Revision Level 2) in Appendix Table 2.122 The 
further correction of employment in Revision Level 3 concerns employment in establish-
ments with five persons or fewer, following the methodology described above. 
Brewing 
 The British data include several activities of the brewing industry, including bottling 
and bottle transport. The B & B estimate considers only brewing itself, and adjusts in-
dustry employment by the ratio of gross sales in brewing to gross value in industry. Our 
estimate adds this activity back to brewing sales to provide a coverage that matches the 
wider coverage of the German data. This results in a slightly higher employment figure. 
As in B & B, German output figures for 1907 are from Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, 
while employment comes from the 1907 census.123 Again, the German employment fig-
ures are distorted upwards relative to the British census by the inclusion of very small 
establishments. However, beer being a taxable good, all legal brewing was presumably 
included in the output data. Hence, correction for employment in small operations can-
not be made in isolation, and some adjustment for the output of these establishments is 
needed as well. I assume that the small firms to be excluded had 80 percent of the pro-
ductivity of the remaining ones. This is the estimate applied by de Jong, Fremdling and 
Timmer for similar industries in the German 1936 census.124
Tobacco 
 B & B approximate the output of tobacco products by the input of tobacco to the in-
dustry. However, for Germany they report only domestic tobacco production, which 
was quite small compared to imports. Our estimate instead rests on the domestic sup-
ply of tobacco, converted into manufactured tobacco.125 Employment data from the 
same source is reported net of employment in tobacco production, which is essentially 
an agricultural activity.126 Adjustment for employment and output in very small estab-
lishments follows the same procedures as in the brewing industry. 
Sugar 
 No adjustments were made to the estimate for sugar. 1907 was a bad harvest, and 
was about 30 percent lower than that of 1906. The German figures appear to include 
121 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Die Ergebnisse,” p. 64ff. 
122 Census employment is taken from Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Berufs- und Volks-
zählung.” 
123 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1909, p. 98. 
124 de Jong, Fremdling, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing.” 
125 Available from Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1909.
126 Employment in tobacco production is available in Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Ta-
bakanbau.” 
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substantial seasonal labor in sugar beet harvesting, an industry that was insignificant in 
Britain. No employment figures for sugar refineries were available that would allow 
proper comparison between similar industries. 
Cement 
 B & B use output and employment data for cement factories from the U.K. census, 
and output and employment in both factories and quarries for Germany from 1910. 
The German survey also reports employment in cement factories separately.127 The ad-
justed productivity comparison is based on factory employment in both countries and 
omits quarries, for which the British census reports no data. 
Other Industries 
 B & B apply their productivity estimate for cement to all other industries. We re-
frain from this in order not to inflate German comparative productivity, and instead 
assume productivity in “Other Industries” to be equal to the aggregate. 
Salt Mining 
 For Germany, B & B provide data on salt extraction rather than salt mining. The re-
vised estimate for 1907 is based on output and employment in salt mining.128
Coal Mining 
 The revised estimate is based on census employment from Kaiserliches Statistisches 
Amt.129 Census employment counts individual occupations in multiproduct firms more 
precisely.130 Hence, the census data are to be preferred.  
Iron Ore Mining 
 B & B take their data from the Board of Trade for coal and ironstone, and record the 
output of ironstone together with total employment in all coal mines.131 However, the 
British census also provides output, value, and employment in iron mines under a dif-
ferent industry classification.132 The German data are from Kaiserliches Statistisches 
Amt.133 Census employment in this source is markedly lower than employment ac-
cording to the industry concept. In Appendix Table 2 the latter enters the corrected 
version of the B & B estimate, while the former appears in Revisions Level 1–3. 
127 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Die Ergebnisse,” p. 68. 
128 From Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1909, p. 98. 
129 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1909, p. 79. 
130 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Berufs- und Volkszählung,” for a description of the 
counting procedures. 
131 Board of Trade, Final Report, p. 66. 
132 Ibid., p. 76. 
133 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, “Berufs- und Volkszählung.” 
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